Introduction
The last few years have witnessed increasing economic globalization stemming from very rapid growth in trade and financial linkages, among other factors. At first sight, one would be tempted to think that tighter trade and financial linkages contribute to the synchronization of business cycles. However, theoretical models do not have a clear prediction regarding the relationship between these variables. In fact, the theoretical literature proposes both positive and negative effects of trade and financial links on the synchronization of cycles, which may, in principle, counteract each other. The question is therefore an empirical one, but the empirical literature also reflects these unclear theoretical predictions, as there are a number of diverging results when testing for the influence of trade and financial integration on business cycle co-movements, which could be due, in part, to the lack of data on bilateral financial flows. This paper estimates the effect of bilateral trade and financial links on output co-movement for a small, open economy such as Spain. We assess whether these two types of linkages exert a positive or negative influence over the synchronization of output and whether the influence is not only statistically but also economically significant.
Assessing whether there is more or less output synchronization is important for a number of reasons. First, more synchronized business cycles would presumably mean a stronger and faster transmission of shocks across countries, which could provide an important reason in favor of international policy coordination. Second, business-cycle synchronization has profound implications for the design and functioning of common currency areas. Third, if business cycles in a country are mostly driven by external factors, domestic policy aimed at economic stabilization will probably have a smaller impact.
Besides knowing whether outputs are more or less synchronized, it is also interesting to know the source of such synchronization. For example, it is important to disentangle whether outputs are synchronized due to the effects of common exogenous shocks (e.g. an oil shock) or due to spillovers stemming from greater integration. In the same vein, if trade linkages lead to business cycle synchronization, external demand will not dampen economic fluctuations, but quite the opposite. This implies that exchange rate policy will be unlikely to play an important role in boosting demand at times of low economic activity. Another interesting application concerns policy reform: knowing whether trade or financial links determine stronger output synchronization might condition the sequence and pace of opening of the current and financial account.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature mainly in two ways. First, most of the existing studies analyze the issue estimating a reduced-form equation. However, there are a number of effects between trade linkages, financial integration and business cycle synchronization -some of them bidirectional-, which need to be taken into account for meaningful results. Although, in principle, instrumental variables can solve these endogeneity problems, the possibility of conflicting indirect effects between these variables might lead to low net effects, even when partial effects are strong. We, therefore, use a system of equations to disentangle direct and indirect effects on the synchronization of business cycles.
Second, many studies suffer from the lack of bilateral data to measure financial linkages and use aggregate financial stocks or flows as a rough proxy. However, aggregate financial flows, which measure financial integration with the rest of the world, are clearly inadequate to explain business cycle co-movements between two countries. The few studies with bilateral data generally use US bilateral financial flows against the rest of the world (or those of the largest economies). There is an important caveat in using these data: such a large economy, or area, influences other countries through many channels other than trade and financial linkages, something that biases the estimated effect on synchronization of activity. To minimize this problem, we take a relatively small and open economy (Spain), as a benchmark and use a new dataset on bilateral financial flows between Spain and a large number of countries, from the Spanish Balance of Payments.
From our empirical exercise, we obtain several conclusions: as in Imbs (2004 and 2006) we find that, both the similarity of productive structure and trade links enhance the synchronization of business cycles. However, our use of bilateral financial flows [as opposed
to Imbs (2004) ], including many emerging economies in the sample [contrary to Imbs (2006) ],
gives us very different results. Contrary to him, we find that bilateral financial links are inversely related to the degree of output comovement, as would be predicted by a standard model of international business cycles [e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)]. 1 As highlighted also by Heathcote and Perry (2004) , this negative relationship might point to financial integration allowing an easier transfer of resources between two economies, something that could enable their decoupling. Both the effects of trade and financial links on output synchronization are statistically and economically significant. In particular, in our benchmark regression we find that increasing trade links by one standard deviation starting from its sample mean raises the bilateral cross-country correlation of GDP from its sample mean of 0.160 to 0.311. In turn, increasing financial links by one standard deviation from its mean lowers the correlation of output from 0.160 to 0.005. In both cases, this represents moving the correlation of output by around 40% of one standard deviation, an economically significant effect. We also find a positive indirect effect of financial linkages on output synchronization: more financially integrated countries induce an increased similarity of productive structures, which in turn increases the correlation of output. This indirect effect of financial links on output co-movement, which has the opposite sign of the direct effect, turns out to be of a lower magnitude than the latter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews recent literature on the relationship between trade and financial integration and business cycle synchronization; section 3 outlines the main theoretical predictions and the estimation strategy; section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
1. For example, in a model with two countries with perfectly integrated financial markets and where output fluctuations are driven by technology shocks, resources will flow towards the country receiving a positive productivity shock from the other country. This will reduce further the degree of output correlation between the two countries, beyond what would be explained by the different exogenous shock alone. Related Literature and theoretical predictions
Although the synchronization of business cycles has been extensively analyzed in the literature, its determinants have not been unequivocally assessed. Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature offer a definitive answer on the direction or sign of potential channels by which trade or financial links may affect business cycle synchronization. Regarding real links, Kose and Yi (2001) suggest that higher trade integration might lead to more or less synchronization of cycles, depending on the nature of trade and the type of shocks affecting both economies. Countries will become more synchronized if there is an increase of intra-industry trade and industry-specific shocks are the main drivers of business cycles. However, if there were more inter-industry trade (i.e. higher specialization), then industry-specific shocks would reduce the co-movement of output in both countries.
Empirical studies have found that higher trade integration increases cross-country output correlations, especially among advanced economies [Frankel and Rose (1998) There might also be some indirect effects of trade links on output synchronization, through the similarity of productive structure or through financial links.
Thus, for example, stronger trade links might increase financial linkages because they promote FDI in export-oriented sectors, or because they foster international loans [Rose and Spiegel (2004) ]. In turn, stronger trade links might induce more or less similarity of economic structure -depending on whether it is mostly inter-industries or intra-industries-which, in turn, influences the co-movement of output.
As for financial linkages, some studies have pointed out a positive relationship between financial integration and business cycle co-movements both in output and consumption in the case of advanced economies [Imbs (2004 and 2006) ]. This empirical result, which runs against the predictions of a standard international business cycle model [Backus et. al (1992) ] does not seem to extend to developing economies [Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) ], something that might explain the difference between our results in section 4 and those of Imbs (2004 and 2006) . In addition, Heathcote and Perri (2004) propose that higher financial integration may arise because of less correlated real shocks, since the diversification gains from asset trade are bigger. By fostering financial flows, financial integration, in turn, would dampen GDP correlations more than the reduction implied by the lower correlation of shocks, in effect decoupling both economies.
As it is the case of trade linkages, there might also be some indirect effects of financial links on output synchronization, through trade links or the similarity of productive structure. In the first case, stronger financial links might allow the relocation of capital by comparative advantage, thus increasing opportunities for trade. In the second case, more financial integration between two economies might increase the similarity of economic structures between the two countries, if FDI flows are concentrated on those sectors where the source country has a comparative advantage, thus replicating the productive structure at home. However, stronger financial links also allow the unhinging of production and consumption, and therefore make it less costly to achieve greater specialization in existence of a number of global common shocks in the 80s (although less prevalent than in the 70s) makes it difficult to identify the source of output co-movements.
2. The CPIS matrix on bilateral financial flows compiled by the IMF provides data for a limited number of years, which is by surveys and therefore is prone to underreporting.
Data and Estimation
We assess empirically whether bilateral trade and financial linkages foster or hinder output co-movement, while taking into account other potentially relevant determinants of business cycle synchronization.
As described in the previous section, both in the case of trade and financial linkages, there are arguments for and against their fostering synchronization. Such different arguments are based on multi-directional channels of influence. This implies potential endogeneity problems in naïve OLS estimations. Moreover, the different directions of indirect effects might offset each other and lead to very small net effects if we just try to correct the endogeneity problem using instrumental variables in a reduced-form estimation as in Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) . Thus, we shall use a system of equations to deal with this problem. We also control for other possible sources of synchronization, such as the convergence of economic policies -which we approximate with the volatility of exchange rates and the differences in inflation rates-or a similar exposure to global shocks, such as oil shocks.
As already mentioned, we use bilateral data to account for trade and financial We thus estimate a system of four equations, in which we test for the determinants of output co-movement (eq. 1), those of trade and financial linkages (eqs. 2 and 3, respectively) and those of the similarity in productive structure (eq. 4). As previously explained, there are theoretical reasons to support the idea that the latter could be a key variable governing the indirect effects of trade and financial links on cycle comovements, as already found by Imbs (2004 and 2006) :
where ρi,t is the correlation between Spain's output and country i at time t; T i,t is bilateral trade integration between Spain and country i at time t; S i,t is an index of the similarity of economic structure between Spain and country i; and F i,t is bilateral financial integration with country i.
3. Apart from the aforementioned CPIS matrix on bilateral investment positions compiled by the IMF, the OECD publishes data on bilateral FDI flows, although we are more interested in financial integration involving total flows.
As described in section 2, the expected sign of the direct effect of trade links on output co-movement (α 1 in Eq. 1) is ambiguous, depending on the nature of trade (intra-vs inter-industry) and of shocks (global versus industry specific). In the same vein, the coefficient in the system of equations and turn it, effectively, into a cross section.
There are large differences in how synchronization (ρ i ) is measured in the literature. 5. Detrending is done using Baxter and King (1999) band-pass filter to eliminate low-and high-frequency components to keep business cycle components defined as those between 6 and 32 quarters. An alternative method used is log first differences (i.e. growth rates). 6. GDP is measured at purchasing power parity and was obtained from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database. We also conducted the same exercise using the correlation of GDP growth rates or the correlation of HP-filtered annual GDP series. The qualitative results remain unchanged in both cases. 
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The measures of financial linkages also differ in the literature. (2004) use, for assets, the sum of FDI plus the equity part of portfolio investment. They also test for separate measures (FDI on one side and equity holdings on the other). 11. The idea is that with perfect risk sharing, disposable income should be unrelated to GDP, whereas in the absence of risk sharing, they should be closely related. Kalemli In order to measure financial integration through a bilateral de facto measure, we use total bilateral financial flows (portfolio and FDI flows) from the Spanish Balance of Payments.
Although data on international financial positions (stocks) would have been a better indicator, it was not available for Spain on a bilateral basis. We measure financial integration by taking the sum of the absolute values of inward and outward financial flows and computing a time average over the period of study, dividing it over the sum of GDPs, to scale their importance relative to the size of economic activity. Note that, by taking average flows over a period of time we diminish the volatility of this measure, one of the problems of using financial flows instead of investment positions.
, , , In our benchmark regressions, we will use the sum of FDI and portfolio flows, but we also conduct robustness checks using only FDI flows and using total equity flows. Additional robustness checks are conducted using a level definition of financial linkages, as in
Imbs (2006):
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The similarity in productive structure can be measured in several alternative ways. All 12. Typically, 2-or 3-digit ISIC classification groups. 13. Generally, 1-digit ISIC classification groups. 14. This is similar to Imbs (2004) but we prefer to use a minus sign in front of the definition of similarity of productive structure so that a higher value of S implies higher similarity between the productive structures in both countries. This of course only changes the sign of its associated estimated parameter, but neither its size nor its significance. 15. In this paper we present the empirical results using the first measure of similarity of productive structure. Both measures outlined here are highly correlated, thus using the second definition does not affect the results significantly. ESP,i described above applied to shares of value added, although the results are robust to using other definitions or data on employment or production, as they are highly correlated. We use data for the industrial sector at the two-digit ISIC level from UNIDO. 16 We also use a number of controls in the regressions as suggested by existing literature. One potential source of business cycle synchronization is the similarity of macroeconomic policies and exposure to global shocks such as movements in the price of oil. For the former we use a number of proxies: the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, the average inflation differential and a dummy variable to account for use of the euro as official currency (in effect, a dummy for the use of the same currency). For the latter, we concentrate on oil shocks by introducing an index of similarity of oil dependency. More specifically, we take each country's net oil imports as a percentage of GDP and average that percentage for the period 1990-2002. We then multiply that measure with the equivalent one for Spain, which is positive 17 . In principle, countries that are more dependent of oil should have a high and positive dependency ratio, whereas oil-exporting countries have a highly negative indicator. A high and positive product of both indicators indicates countries that are affected negatively by an oil shock, as Spain.
In the case of trade linkages, a number of studies have suggested that gravity variables play an important role in explaining trade links between two countries. We therefore include (the log of) distance between countries, land areas, and dummy variables to account for access to the sea, a common main language and membership in the European Union.
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Recent studies [e.g. Portes and Rey (2005) ] have suggested that gravity variables might also explain bilateral financial linkages. Thus, we include (the log of) distance, the time difference between main financial centres, a dummy for common language and the partner's per capita GDPs. This last variable tries to capture the idea that richer countries tend to generate more financial flows (both inward and outward).
Surely the most difficult variable to explain is the similarity of productive structure. (2003) we use the pair-wise difference of per capita GDPs, based on the idea that rich countries tend to have a more diversified productive structure, but in a similar way among themselves, whereas poorer countries tend to be more specialized in production.
Following on Imbs and Wacziarg
Taking all these variables into account, we end up with a sample of 109 countries (counterparts to Spain), of which 21 are developed countries and 88 are emerging or developing countries (see table 13).
16. We could in principle use data at the three-digit ISIC level and increase the disaggregation of activities. However, some countries in the sample do not report data at that level of disaggregation, and therefore we opted for a lower level of disaggregation in order to increase the sample size. 17. Details of the construction and sources used for this oil dependency index can be found in appendix 2. 18. Some studies include, instead of common language, a dummy variable capturing past colonial relationship. In the case of Spain both variables coincide.
Estimation Results
As a preliminary step we show some stylized facts of the main variables of interest in this study: business cycle synchronization, trade and FDI linkages. again in the last few years. As for total financial flows, they have risen substantially in the last six years (reliable bilateral data is only available from 1997). The surge concentrates on the euro area and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom (Figure 4) . 19 The importance of Latin America is much smaller than for FDI flows.
Turning to the estimation of our system of four equations, we first report the results of the estimation of equation 1 in section 3, our equation of interest, using OLS. Table 1 in appendix 1 reports parameter estimates for different specifications. A salient feature of these estimations is the negligible role of financial integration or the similarity of productive structure in promoting a closer comovement of output between Spain and other countries.
Only trade links seem to promote stronger output synchronization, and even that effect disappears once we control for membership of the euro area, which in turn might be increasing trade and financial flows.
19. The United Kingdom accounts for almost 95 percent of total financial flows to EU countries outside the euro area. 20 Table 2 presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates for the same specifications as sample. Indeed, we find some evidence of a different effect of developed and emerging economies when we estimate an alternative version of the system of equations described in table 3. In particular, we include a dummy variable for emerging economies, interacted with our measure of financial linkages as explanatory variables for equations 1, 2 and 4. With this inclusion we find that, for developed countries, the effect of financial integration on output synchronization is positive [as in Imbs (2004 and 2006) ], but statistically not significant.
20.
Instruments used in the IV estimation are the same as those used for three stage least squares, described next.
However, the effect of financial links on output synchronization is negative (and statistically significant) in the case of emerging economies. This gives support to our claim that the higher prevalence of emerging economies in our sample might account for the difference in the sign of α 3 , between our paper and Imbs (2006). The same negative sign appears if we only introduce a separate effect for emerging economies in equation 1. 21 As for the control variables, our measure of similar fuel dependency is not statistically significant in explaining output correlations in this exercise, which might point to oil shocks not being an important factor driving global economic fluctuations in the period of study (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , as they probably were in the 70s or, to a lesser extent, in the 80s. The same is true for the inflation differential and the exchange volatility. However, being member of the euro area does seem to foster business cycle synchronization. Finally, the last column in table 3 tries to identify the determinants of the similarity in productive structure (eq. 4). As in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) the absolute difference in per capita GDPs is a good explanatory variable, together with financial flows.
Beyond the direct effects on GDP correlation of our main variables of interest (eq. 1), there are also possible indirect effects of trade and financial linkages on business cycle synchronization, both through their influence on each other and though their effect on the similarity of productive structures. As described before, in table 3, our benchmark regression, we find no statistically significant effect from (to) trade links to (from) financial links, and only a significantly positive effect of financial links on the similarity of productive structure, which might point to the importance of FDI flows and its influence on production in the recipient country.
Considering all -direct and indirect-effects of financial links on business cycle synchronization, the net impact is negative, as summarized by α 3 + α 2 γ 2 + α 1 β 2 = -0.0083.
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As expected by the non-significance of the indirect effects of trade, including them does not 21. The results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request. 22. Using the delta method, a test of significance of this estimate gives a t-statistic of -2.72, with a p-value of 0.007.
significantly change the estimate of its total effect on business cycle synchronization, given by α 1 + α 2 γ 1 + α 3 δ 2 = 0.113.
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The positive influence of a similar economic structure and trade links on business cycle synchronization is in line with Imbs (2004) , though the effect of financial linkages is negative in our case and positive in his. This difference might be related both to the fact that we use a small open economy as a benchmark, a wider set of partner countries (including more emerging countries than in his sample), and bilateral financial links, instead of a broad proxy derived from aggregate financial integration in both partners as in his case. Another reason, as regard financial linkages, might be that our data includes FDI and portfolio flows which are only a part of all possible financial linkages, albeit possibly the most important ones that might influence the synchronization of economic activity.
There are few other findings worth highlighting from the system of equations we estimate. First, we do find a reverse causality from business cycle synchronization to financial linkages (i.e. δ 1 is significantly different from zero), as argued by Heathcote and Perri (2004) .
Second, the estimation does not find a double causality between trade and financial linkages (i.e. δ 1 and β 2 are not statistically significant from zero). Another important question concerns the economic relevance of the statistically significant effects found in the previous exercise. As described before, the total effect of trade and that of financial links on the synchronization of business cycles is given through their direct and indirect effects. Specifically, for our benchmark 3SLS regression in table 3, the effect of trade links on our measure of comovement of output is α 1 + α 2 γ 1 + α 3 δ 2 = 0.113 whereas the effect of financial links is α 3 + α 2 γ 2 + α 1 β 2 = -0.0083. In order to gauge whether this effect on output synchronization is big or small, we can check the effect of increasing trade or financial links by one standard deviation, as described in table 11. Increasing trade links by one standard deviation starting from its mean raises bilateral cross-country correlation of GDP from 0.160 to 0.311. In turn, increasing financial links by one standard deviation lowers the correlation of output from 0.160 to 0.005. In both cases, this represents moving the correlation of output by around 40% of one standard deviation, an economically significant effect (table 10) .
We conduct a number of additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results.
Since the most interesting result probably is the negative impact of financial linkages on output co-movement, we explore alternative measures of financial links. First, we include total (Table 10 ).
The other dimension in which we check for the robustness of our results is the normalization of trade and financial links as proportion of GDP. Since we are interested in measuring the effect of trade and financial links on the synchronization of output, it is perhaps more relevant to normalize the size of those links by the smaller of the two GDPs in the country pair under scrutiny. The idea is that, for the same size of trade flows, two countries might be more synchronized the more unequal they are in size, since then the bigger country can "pull" the other more strongly through external demand or financial links.
Thus, we conduct the same estimations displayed in tables 3, 5 and 6 but with trade and financial links defined as percentage of the minimum of the two GDPs involved. 34 Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All variables measured in logs except dummy variables. Table 2 IV regressions Dependent variable: GDP correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Table 10
Specification as in: Table 3 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Absolute variation of GDP Table 12 Cross Correlations 1 Average over the period of the sum of bilateral exports plus imports over the sum of GDPs 2 Average over the period of total bilateral inflows and outflows to and from Spain 3 Computed from value added from the industrial sector only. Higher values imply more similarity. 4 Coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate with Spain (monthly average).
